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Articles
The Beleaguered Gatekeeper: Protection
Challenges Posed by UNHCR Refugee
Status Determination
MICHAEL KAGAN*

Abstract
The number of individual RSD applications received by UNHCR offices worldwide
nearly doubled from 1997 to 2001, while UNHCR's RSD operations have been criticized
for failing to implement basic standards of procedural fairness. Yet, although there is
some literature critiquing how UNHCR determines refugee status, there is little literature
examining whether UNHCR should do so, and if it should, when, where, and under what
conditions.
UNHCR performance of RSD poses protection challenges because it is founded on a
basic contradiction. On the one hand, government action is essential for effective refugee
protection. On the other hand, UNHCR RSD is premised on at least partial government
failure.
Neither direct concern for protection from non-refoulement nor strict legal obligations
completely explain UNHCR's current RSD activities. UNHCR's RSD activities seem
best explained by what Goodwin-Gill has called 'negative responsibility', and hence can
represent a risky shift of responsibility from governments to the UN. At the same time, in
some circumstances UNHCR RSD substantially advances refugee rights.
In order to match its actual mandate and resources, UNHCR should perform RSD
when it can enhance the protection provided to refugees by governments, but the activity
should be more limited and conditional than it is today.

1. Introduction: A crowd at the fence
At many UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) offices around
the Middle East, a common scene develops in the morning. Iraqis,
Sudanese, Somalis, and a few people from farther away gather at the
* Revised May 2004 and December 2005. This article stems in large part from my
experience working to develop refugee legal aid and advocacy programs in Egypt and Lebanon
from 2001 through 2003. For this opportunity, I am especially grateful to Samira Trad for her
courage and determination, and to Liza Hazelton and Prof. Barbara Harrell-Bond for their wisdom
and collaboration. The work and research which led to this article was funded by the Initiative
for Public Interest Law at Yale, the Clara Belfield & Henry Bates Overseas Travel Fellowship at
the University of Michigan Law School, and the American University in Cairo Forced Migration
and Refugee Studies Program. Michael Alexander and Prof. James C. Hathaway provided useful
comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed here are solely my own.
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outer fence. Some arrive early in the morning. Most are men, but there
are some women and occasionally children. The crowd presses in toward
openings in the fence without any clear order; on crowded days they
sometimes push each other for position, elbows used for leverage.
Every so often voices are raised.
These people - refugees and asylum-seekers - come to UNHCR
with a range of queries, petitions, and complaints. Some have just arrived
and want to start their applications for refugee protection. Some have
been accepted by UNHCR before, and want to be resettled. Rejected
asylum-seekers look for someone to ask how to re-open their cases.
Often, just a single person works for UNHCR at the fence, fielding
questions from the crowd, trying to distinguish those who should be let
into the office, while providing quick answers to others. UN staff often
collect inquiries, slips of paper, and documents to take inside and return
to the fence with official responses. The refugees and asylum-seekers at
the gate often remain for hours, while in the summer the temperatures
can reach over 40 degrees in the sun.
This daily scene outside UNHCR offices, which I have personally
witnessed in both Cairo and Beirut, is the most publicly visible link in
an increasingly important but little studied part of refugee protection: the
determination of refugee status by UNHCR.
Refugee status determination (RSD) is the doorway to the protection
and assistance that the international community provides to refugees. In
dozens of countries, UNHCR acts as the gatekeeper. In this role, which
was little noticed in academic and NGO literature until recently, the
UN's refugee agency effectively decides among asylum-seekers who can
be saved from deportation and in some cases released from detention,
who can get humanitarian assistance, and often who can apply to
resettle to third countries.
Since the mid-1990s, scholarly and NGO literature has been critical of
the way UNHCR performs RSD. In the seminal study on the subject,
Michael Alexander argued that UNHCR's RSD systems had been left
behind by the standards of fairness developed elsewhere. Other assessments have repeated similar criticism. 2 In September 2005, UNHCR for
the first time published comprehensive procedural standards governing
its RSD activities. At the same time, UNHCR RSD has steadily grown.
1 M.

Alexander, 'Refugee Status Determination Conducted by UNHCR', I1I JRL 251 (1999).

2 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Selective protection: Discriminatoy treatment ofnon-European refugees and

asylum-seekers, EUR 44/16/94 (Mar. 1994); Iranian Refugees Alliance, Evading Scrutiny: Does Refugee
Status Determination Procedure Measure Up to International Standards? (May 1995); Human Rights Watch,
50 Years On: What Future for Refugee Protection? (2001); Human Rights Watch, Hidden in Plain View:
Refugees Living Without Protection in Nairobi and Kampala (2002); M. Kagan, Assessment of Refugee Status
Determination Procedure at UNHCR's Cairo Office 2001-2002, American University in Cairo Forced
Migration and Refugee Studies Working Paper No. 1 (2002), available at www.aucegypt.edu/
academic/fmrs (follow 'Reports' link).
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The number of individual 3 RSD applications received by UNHCR
offices worldwide nearly doubled from 1997 to 200 1.4 UNHCR performed RSD in at least 60 countries in 2001, nearly all in the developing
world and received approximately 66 000 individual refugee claims,
more than the United States, five times more than Australia, and about
as many as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece and Spain combined.5
refugee populations, and is
UNHCR RSD predominantly affects urban
6
particularly common in the Middle East.
Although most of this activity has been in the geopolitical south,
UNHCR has also occasionally offered its RSD services as a means of
resolving refugee protection conflicts in wealthy countries. In one of the
most controversial recent examples, UNHCR performed RSD in Nauru
to resolve the crisis over the Australia-bound asylum-seekers who were
rescued at sea by the Tampa in 2001. UNHCR also offered to perform
RSD to help resolve the British-French dispute over the Sangette camp
near Calais in 2002, although in that case the governments did not
accept.
This growth in UN-administered RSD has occurred even though
status determination is normally assumed to be a government
responsibility. 7 Although there is a growing literature critiquing how
UNHCR determines refugee status, there is little literature examining
whether UNHCR should do so and, if it should, when, where, and
under what conditions. This article is based on the premise that
UNHCR will not be able to fully resolve the weaknesses of its RSD
procedures until it resolves these underlying questions.
3 In cases of mass influx, governments and UNHCR sometimes recognize whole groups of
asylum-seekers as refugees on a prima facie basis. The focus in this article is on individual RSD,
a typically intensive adjudication that decides the fate of a single person or family. But even when
UNHCR initially avoids individual RSD by providing protection to groups of refugees on a primafacie
basis, cessation of refugee protection can require a large-scale, short-term burden on UNHCR to
provide an individual hearing for refugees who do not want to repatriate. For instance, after
UNHCR decided to cease primafacie protection of Eritrean refugees in Sudan in 2002, it conducted
individual screening of cases to determine if individuals had continuing reasons for fearing persecution in Eritrea. UNHCR announced in Feb. 2003 that it would hear close to 27 000 claims, involving
almost 100 000 people, by Eritreans in Sudan who were resisting the cessation of their refugee status.
See 'ERITREA: Refugee screening underway in Sudan', UN Integrated Regional Information
Network (IRIN) (16 Sept. 2002); UNHCR, 'Tens of thousands of Eritreans re-apply for refugee
status in Sudan' (10 Feb. 2003).
4 UNHCR Statistical rearbook 2001 (2002) at 49. For more updated statistical information, see
www.rsdwatch.org.
5 UNHCR, Statistical Overview 2001 (provisional); UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2001 (2002),
above n. 4, at 49; 2001 Statistical rearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service at 17.
6 Individual applications in nineteen Arab League states plus Cyprus, Israel and Turkey constituted more than half of UNHCR's worldwide RSD cases in 2001. Computed from UNHCR,
Statistical Overview, above n. 5.
7 See UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 8(d) (1977) (expressing 'the hope that all
Governments party to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol which had not yet done so would
take steps to establish such procedures in the near future').
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My analysis is based largely on experience with UNHCR RSD in the
Middle East from 2001 through 2003, principally in Egypt and Lebanon.
UNHCR faced its largest RSD caseload in the world during this period
in Egypt. This analysis focuses on situations in which UNHCR is solely
responsible for RSD, with little or no government involvement. It hence
may not apply to a number of other countries, as diverse as Israel and
Uganda, in which RSD decisions are made by a government but
UNHCR is heavily involved in assessing cases.
I argue that UNHCR RSD poses serious protection challenges because
it is founded on a basic contradiction. On the one hand, government
action is essential for effective refugee protection. On the other hand,
UNHCR RSD is premised on at least partial government failure.
UNHCR steps in to determine refugee status only when governments
prove unwilling or unable to do so.
I conclude that in some circumstances UNHCR RSD substantially
advances refugee rights by effectively facilitating basic protection to
refugees who otherwise might be left vulnerable. At the same time,
UNHCR's RSD work appears driven by an implicit tendency to attempt
to fill protection gaps left by governments. This is a role that UNHCR
often has neither the mandate nor the resources to perform because
UNHCR has the power to promote, but not to provide, refugee protection. I argue that UNHCR needs to reduce its current RSD activities to
match its actual mandate and resources. UNHCR should perform RSD
when it can enhance the protection provided to refugees by governments,
but the activity should be limited and conditional.

2. Successes and challenges in UNHCR RSD
This section will first identify major ways in which UNHCR's performance of RSD effectively enhances refugee protection. It will then
summarize major corresponding protection concerns which stem from
UNHCR's RSD work.
2.1 Three major ways UNHCR RSD facilitates protection
UNHCR RSD facilitates protection for refugees in three main ways:
promoting the principle of non-refoulement, assisting in the promotion of
durable solutions, and identifying refugees in need of social and economic
assistance.
2.1.1 Non-refoulement
By conducting RSD, UNHCR is often able to promote implementation
of the principle of non-refoulement, at least in some cases. For instance, in
Egypt, in accordance with a 1954 agreement between the government
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and UNHCR, Egypt agreed to grant residence permits to 'bona fide
refugees, residing in Egypt, who fall within the High Commissioner's
mandate'. 9 The agreement ruled out any permanent refuge for asylumseekers in Egypt. UNHCR agreed to facilitate voluntary repatriation and
to seek resettlement in other countries 'in every possible measure, in the
countries of immigration, for the refugees residing in Egypt'.' 0 RSD was
left in the hands of the United Nations; UNHCR agreed to 'cooperate
with the governmental authorities in view of undertaking a census of and
identif,yi g the refugees eligible under the mandate of the High Commissioner'. 11 Half a century later, UNHCR continued to identify refugees
who meet the legal criteria, the Government granted them residence
permits, and UNHCR sought durable solutions for refugees, with a particular emphasis on resettlement and with little prospect of local integration. 12 Through this arrangement, UNHCR RSD delivered enforceable
protection for refugees, helping Egypt to comply with article 33 of the
Refugee Convention. 13
UNHCR RSD does not always ensure non-refoulement, however. In
Lebanon, the practical mechanisms for protecting and assisting nonPalestinian refugees and asylum-seekers were largely identical to those in
Egypt: the country had no refugee legislation and UNHCR carried out
RSD and referred many or most refugees for resettlement. Yet, until
2003,14 the government of Lebanon never committed itself to even
temporary residence for asylum-seekers and refugees. Lebanon has not
ratified the Refugee Convention, and refugee protection depended on a
'Gentlemen's Agreement' with the General Security Department, which
in theory reduced arrests and prevented deportations. Yet, beginning
in 2000, the Lebanese government launched a widespread crackdown
on undocumented migrants, without distinction for refugees and
8

Agreement Between the Egyptian Government and UNHCR (on file with author).
9 Ibid. article 6.
10 Ibid. article 2(b).
1 Ibid. article 2(a).
12 See UNHCR, 2002 Global Appeal 136 ('None of these refugees [under UNHCR protection] are
economically self-reliant, and none have integrated locally... despite UNHCR's efforts in that direction... At present, political, social and economic conditions in Egypt continue to militate against
success in these efforts').
13 CSR51 article 33(l): 'No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion'.
14 In Sept. 2003, UNHCR and Lebanese authorities signed a Memorandum of Understanding
granting refugees and asylum-seekers a maximum of 12 months residence in Lebanon, and guaranteeing UNHCR access to them in detention. The implementation and ramifications of the UNHCRLebanon agreement were not included in the main period of study for this article. However, the basic
structure of the agreement raises concerns because long- and even medium- term protection relies
completely on UNHCR finding resettlement opportunities for all refugees. In the past this was rarely
achieved in 12 months, especially after Sept. 11.
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asylum-seekers. Hundreds of refugees and asylum-seekers were reportedly
deported over the following years, especially to Iraq. 15 From late 1999
until October 2001, UNHCR was often denied access to detained
asylum-seekers and refugees. 16
2.1.2 Durable solutions
UNHCR RSD assisted efforts to promote durable solutions for refugees,
though extensive reliance on resettlement became more problematic after
September 11. Seeking durable solutions for refugees is one of the main
objectives of UNHCR protection.17 In the Middle East, resettlement has
often been the primary durable solution because local integration prospects are generally slim. For instance, in Egypt, beyond the basic right
to residence, the government denies refugees most key social and economic rights, and refugees faced a growing level of racial harassment
and occasional violence against African migrants. 18 Since UNHCR refers
many or most of the recognized refugees in Egypt to third countries,
UNHCR RSD was a first step toward resettlement processing. In the
late 1990s and early part of this decade, between 2 000 and 3 000 refugees were referred by UNHCR for resettlement from Egypt in most
years. 19 For the US and Canada, UNHCR referral was usually the
20
only means of being accepted for resettlement from Egypt.
However, UNHCR's capacity to use RSD as a gateway to resettlement
is fraught with limits. Resettlement quotas are small relative to the global
refugee population, and processing is slow. Refugees hence need to
be able to spend significant time - in many cases, years - in their
first country of asylum. In Lebanon, where the government did not recognize even a temporary right of residence for refugees, refugees faced
a serious protection crisis when resettlement opportunities dwindled.
After September 11, 2001, the US government temporarily suspended
its refugee resettlement program while it devised new security screening
measures. Since the threat of refoulement was higher in Lebanon than in
Egypt, the normal priority-setting criteria set out in UNHCR's Resettlement
Handbook would have called for resettlement from Lebanon to be a higher
15 See Amnesty International, 'Lebanon: refugees and asylum-seekers at risk', MDE 18/002/2001
(26 Feb. 2001); Amnesty International, 'Lebanon: Amnesty International reiterates its concerns on
the situation of refugees and asylum-seekers', MDE 18/005/2002 (3 May 2002); UNHCR 2003
Global Appeal at 137 ('Due to the strict application by the Lebanese Government of its immigration
legislation, asylum-seekers and persons recognized as refugees by UNHCR risk detention and
deportation, often to Syria, on the grounds of illegal entry and residence in the country').
See Ibid. at 134.
'' UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook (Nov. 2004) at 2.
8aC. Johnston, 'Egypt's African migrants dodge rocks, fight racism', Reuters (24 June 2002).
19 UNHCR-Cairo statistical report, June 2002 (on file with author).
20 Some refugees are resettled from Egypt to Canada with private sponsorships, without UNHCR
referral. However, UNHCR-referred cases are more numerous in Egypt. Australia provides resettlement to a larger number of refugees and 'humanitarian' cases who have private sponsorship.
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priority. Yet, processing for US resettlement from Egypt resumed in
March 2002,2 1 but by the end of 2003, US resettlement had not resumed
in Lebanon, and many who had been 'tentatively approved' by the US
2
before September 11 were still in limbo nearly two years later.
2.1.3 Direct assistance
UNHCR RSD identified refugees to whom UNHCR could directly
provide some social and economic assistance. Yet, the future of direct
UNHCR aid to urban refugees in the Middle East was threatened
by UNHCR's increasingly strained budget. From 1999 through 2002,
during which time UNHCR was grappling with a nearly two-fold
increase in applications, UNHCR-Cairo's operating budget dropped
from around $4 000 000 to around $3 000000.23 UNHCR-Cairo's
annual 'care and maintenance' funds for assisting refugees declined
42 percent from 1997 to 2001 .24 Only about half of UNHCR-Cairo's
operating budget went to direct social or economic assistance to
refugees in 2002.25
UNHCR's policy on urban refugees places great stress on promoting
self-reliance, but lack of funds imperiled UNHCR-sponsored self-reliance
programs in Egypt.2 6 A news bulletin by UNHCR highlighted the
human costs in inadequate medical care, poor housing, and hunger
caused by a growing refugee population and a shrinking assistance budget.2 7 In one case, an Eritrean two-year-old boy became ill and died,
apparently from inadequate medical care, while his mother's RSD appeal
was pending at the UNHCR Cairo office. 8 A UNHCR-sponsored evaluation concluded:
Altogether, one must conclude that while UNHCR made attempts to implement
the self-reliance component of the policy on urban refugees in Cairo the results
have been less than successful. The policy is meant to help refugees secure
an independent source of income while reducing the financial burden on
UNHCR. What happened in Egypt is that the organization both lacked the
funds to implement the policy and could not persuade the authorities to provide
a legal framework for its implementation. Despite this it went on to reduce its

21

See US Committee for Refugees, 'Resettlement to Resume at some Middle Eastern Posts, on

Hold at Others', (2002).
22 See B. Osmat, M. Kagan, and S. Trad, 'Promises without solutions: Iraqi refugees left in the
lurch in Lebanon', (Sept. 2003) 18 Forced Migration Review 42.
23 See UNHCR, 1999 Global Appeal and 2002 Global Appeal.
24 See S. Sperl, Evaluation of UNHCR's policy on refugees in urban areas: A case study review of Cairo,
UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, EPAU/2001.07 (June 2001) at 14.
25 UNHCR, 'Hard Times for Cairo's Refugees', (25 Nov. 2002) (noting that UNHCR-Cairo's
current urban assistance budget is $1.5 million, or $171 per refugee).
26 See Sperl, above n. 24, at 3, 12-15.
27 UNHCR, above n. 25.
25 Ibid.
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care and maintenance expenditures drastically, with severe consequences
for
29
the refugees who are facing a life of increasingly desperate penury.
2.2 Strains on the system
Refugee flows are often quite volatile and can differ from country to
country. But, as I noted in the introduction, the general global trend
reported by UNHCR through 2001 was a significant increase in the number of new asylum-seekers making individual applications to UNHCR
offices. Backlogs of pending cases at UNHCR offices grew as well, with
more than 70 000 people waiting for UNHCR to decide their cases at the
end of 2001.3° In 1998, UNHCR's Department of International Protection initiated a 'Refugee Status Determination Project' that provides
additional staffing in response to 'reports from field operations of a grow31
ing inability to process claims for refugee status in a timely manner'.
The effects of this growth could be seen at a microlevel in Egypt, which
was home to one of the five largest urban refugee populations in the
developing world. 32 The number of persons seeking refugee protection
annually at UNHCR-Cairo gew 96 percent from 1998 to 2001, including 13 176 applicants in 2001 33 and 9 002 in 2002. 3 1 With this increase in
applications, UNHCR's Cairo office handled more individual refugee
claims than any other UNHCR office in 2001 and 2002. 35
Initially, UNHCR opted not to increase RSD processing capacity at its
Cairo office for fear of generating a 'pull-factor'. 36 Reversing this choice
in 2001, UNHCR initiated a temporary RSD Project which funded
additional staffing and the opening of a secondary office to handle only
Sudanese refugee claims in the first half of 2002. But this project was
intended to be temporary only. It was scheduled to expire in 2003, and
it did not eliminate the backlog of cases. 37 At the end of March 2003,
UNHCR reported that it still had 12 200 pending, undecided RSD cases
in Egypt.38
29 Sperl, above n. 24, at 15.
30 UNHCR explains: 'UNHCR offices are experiencing increasing difficulties in processing new
claims. The number of undecided cases quadrupled from 16400 in 1997 to 71 400 in 2001, while the
number of offices with more than 500 cases pending doubled to 18 from 1999 to 2001'. Ibid. at 49.
31 UNHCR website (www.unhcr.ch, under Protecting Refugees, Capacity Building) (last checked
3 Aug. 2003).
32 See Sperl, above n. 24, at 1.
33 UNHCR-Cairo statistical report, June 2002 (on file with author).
34 2002 UNHCR Population Statistics (Provisional), 4 Aug. 2003.
35 The one country with more applications than Egypt in 2002 was Sudan, with 27 023. However,
this was nearly entirely a one-time aberration resulting from screening not of new asylum-seekers, but
of Eritrean refugees who had been recognized on a primafacie basis and who were applying for the
right to continue to stay in Sudan rather than be repatriated. See above n. 5; UNHCR, 2001
Statistical Overview, above n. 5; UNHCR, Population Statistics 2002 (4 Aug. 2003).
36 See Sperl, above n. 24, at 8.
37 See Kagan, above n. 2, at 39.
38 UNHCR, 'Trends in Refugee Status Determination 1January - 31 March 2003', (4July 2003) 1.
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2.3 Inadequate procedural safeguards
In his 1999 study of UNHCR RSD procedures, Michael Alexander
concluded that in terms of basic fairness, UNHCR's RSD procedures
had been left behind by developments in administrative and human rights
law. 39 There were some signs of improvement in procedures, at least in
some UNHCR offices. In Cairo, initial steps were taken to make the
appeal system somewhat more independent. 0 Cairo was the site of
substantial innovation in the provision of legal aid and advice to asylumseekers in the UNHCR RSD process. UNHCR accepted asylum-seekers'
rights to counsel. Initial statistics collected in 2002 from three separate
legal aid initiatives in Cairo showed that asylum-seekers who had some
form of advice or assistance had a significantly higher chance of being
recognized as refugees by UNHCR.4 1 On the downside, such progress
was hardly universal. In Lebanon, during the period when government
pressure on refugees increased, UNHCR's recognition rate in its RSD
procedures in Lebanon dropped dramatically. Whereas UNHCR-Cairo
recognized and implemented asylum-seekers' right to counsel in RSD, the
UNHCR-Beirut office resisted efforts by a Lebanese NGO to offer individual counseling and representation.
UNHCR addressed procedural issues through the publication of
'Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination under
UNHCR's Mandate' in September 2005. The new standards state
clearly that asylum-seekers may bring legal representatives with them to
RSD interviews, and recommends (but does not require) field offices to
give rejected applicants specific reasons for decision. But the standards do
not establish an independent structure for deciding appeals, and leave in
place UNHCR's policy of withholding from asylum-seekers critical evidence considered in their cases. In general, the core of Alexander's 1999
criticisms of UNHCR RSD procedures appears generally valid today.
In addition, UNHCR has now issued more comprehensive advice to
states about standards necessary for a fair and effective RSD procedure.
As a result, in terms of procedural fairness there is now a gap not just
between UNHCR RSD practice and international standards, but also
between what UNHCR says about RSD procedures, and UNHCR's
own actual practice.
In May 2001, as part of its Global Consultations on International
Protection, UNHCR issued its most comprehensive guidance on RSD
procedures to date, a background paper called Fair and Efficient Asylum
Procedures. This paper updated previous UNHCR advice to governments
39 Alexander, above n. 1, at 255.
40
41

See Kagan, above n. 2, at 33-34.
For full discussion of these statistics and legal aid programs in Cairo during this period, see

M. Kagan, 'Frontier Justice: Refugee Legal Aid and UNHCR Refugee Status Determination in
Egypt', JRS (forthcoming).
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about fairness in RSD.4 2 UNHCR added to this guidance in February
2003 with comments submitted to the Council of Europe. 43 Many of
the standards emphasized by UNHCR in these documents remained
unimplemented at its offices. The following table 4 4 provides a summary,
based on practices in Cairo at the end of 2002:
Procedural standards
implemented

Procedural standards not
implemented

* Applicants had access to the
refugee status determination
procedure.
* Applicants had the right to
remain in the country while their
cases are pending.
* As of November 2002, appeals were
screened by a partially independent
unit (though independence meeting
UN standards has not been achieved).
* Special procedures were in place
to expedite applications by especially
vulnerable people.
* Applicants have the right to legal
representation and other forms
of advice.
* Applicants were given some
information about the procedure
to be followed.
" Interpreters were provided by
UNHCR in the most common
languages spoken by asylum-seekers.
" Asylum-seekers had the right
to an oral hearing at the first
instance stage.

" Specific written reasons for
rejection were not provided;
detailed case assessments in
UNHCR files were withheld
from applicants and their
legal representatives.
* Evidence considered in cases was
withheld from the applicants
concerned; withholding reports
from forensic medical exams
appeared to violate medical
ethics and may have violated
Egyptian law.
* There are reasons for concern that
the decision-making process was
structured so that positive decisions
received more thorough and more
immediate scrutiny than negative
decisions. The practice of durable
solutions staff reviewing positive
RSD decisions violated the
principle of resjudicata.
* Negative credibility decisions were
reached without providing specific
reasons, and often without
follow-up interviews.

42

UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions No. 8 (1977); OAU-UNHCR Guidelines for

National Refugee Legislation and Commentary (1980); UNHCR, Note, Fair and Expeditious
Asylum Procedures (1994).
43 UNHCR annotated comments on the amended proposal for a Council Directive on minimum
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, COM(2002)
326 final of 18 June 2002, presented by the Commission (hereafter 'Comments to the Council of
Europe').
44 Table adapted from Kagan, above n. 2, at 37.
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staff appeared increasingly
well-trained in proper interviewing
techniques.
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0 Most appeals were rejected
without an in-person re-hearing.
0 Many critical parts of the
standard operating procedures of
the UNHCR-Cairo office were
withheld from the public.

One of the more far reaching limits of the UNHCR procedure is the
withholding of evidence. Alexander noted in 1999 that UNHCR offices
typically do not permit asylum-seekers or their legal representatives to
have access to their own files, 4 5 a practice continued in Cairo in 2001
and 2002. In August 2001, UNHCR's Department of International
Protection issued a memorandum directing field offices to withhold evidence from asylum-seekers. 46 The memorandum prohibits UNHCR
offices from distributing 'UNHCR generated information' to applicants
or their legal representatives, and specifically prohibits disclosure of
interview transcripts.4 7 UNHCR repeated this standard in September
2005 in its 'Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination
under UNHCR's Mandate':
As a general rule, UNHCR interview transcripts and notes should not be
disclosed, however the interview transcript taken directly from Applicant's
own
48
statements may be read back to the Applicant during the interview.
Evidence routinely withheld from applicants in Cairo included reports
from mental health assessments and medical examinations of their
bodies, transcripts of their own interviews, statements by other witnesses,
and country of origin information.
Established principles of human rights and administrative law make
clear that people have the right to know evidence in their cases against
them in an administrative decision-making process, especially evidence
that might be used against them. 49 Such protections are particularly

4s Alexander, above n. 1, at 273-277.
46 See Kagan, above n. 2, at 24-27.
47 UNHCR, Department of International Protection, Protection Policy and Legal Advice Section,
UNHCR Guidelines on the Sharing of Information on Individual Cases 'Confidentiality Guidelines',

Aug. 2001, at paras. 21, 26, 27, (on file with author).
4 UNHCR,

'Procedural

Standards

for Refugee Status

Determination

under UNHCR's

Mandate', section 2.1.2 (2005).

49 See Feldbrugge v. Netherlands, A99 Eur. Ct. H.R. (29 May 1986) (holding in an employment

disability case that a fair hearing requires that a party be allowed to consult the reports made by
two gynaecological experts used by the authorities); Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers
(Principle 21), Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and

the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 Aug.-7 Sept. 1990.
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strong when the stakes are high, as they clearly are in refugee status
determination. 50 The European Court of Human Rights has held specifically that claimants in administrative hearings
have the right to see
51
medical reports considered in their cases.
UNHCR took a different approach in 2003 comments to the Council
of Europe. UNHCR specified that country of origin information should
'be available to the asylum-seeker and his or her legal adviser/counselor
as well as be subject to the scrutiny of reviewing bodies'. 52 UNHCR
expressed concern about a proposed European standard that would
allow some limitations to access to information in an applicant's file for
an asylum-seeker and his or her legal advisor:
UNHCR is concerned that this would leave asylum-seekers and decision-makers
in unequal positions. UNHCR therefore recommends that information and its
sources may be withheld only under clearly defined conditions where disclosure
of sources would seriously jeopardize national 53security or the security of the
organizations or persons providing information.
Transparency in evidence remains one of the most severe gaps
between established standards of procedural fairness and UNHCR's
RSD procedures.

3. UNHCR protection and government primacy
3.1 The primacy of government policy
Of the three main benefits of UNHCR RSD identified in the
previous section, the two that are most important - non-refoulement and
resettlement - depend heavily on government action. They are not fully,
or even primarily, within the control of UNHCR. Although refugee
status determination by UNHCR is often called 'mandate status determination', it is unrealistic to expect UNHCR to itself provide effective
protection through its mandate alone. In reality, governments, not
50 As one text on administrative law explains:
[C]ompliance with a fair procedure should require that [a person] is informed of the case against
him, to the extent that there is one, so that he can tailor his submissions accordingly and, where
appropriate, refute some of the allegations, correct mistakes, or explain away otherwise damaging
evidence.... Clearly the more that is at stake for the applicant, the greater the obligation to give
notice of the case to be met.
M.T. Moran, Administrative Law, 2nd Ed., (1999), 136-7. UNHCR has said, 'The importance of these
[RSD] procedures cannot be overemphasized.... A wrong decision might cost the person's life or
liberty'. See Determination of Refugee Status, RLD 2 (1989), chapter 2.
51 Feldbrugge v. Netherlands, above n. 50.
52 UNHCR annotated comments on the amended proposal for a Council Directive on minimum
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, COM(2002)
326 of 18June 2002, at 8 (commenting on Article 7).
53 Ibid. at 12 (commenting on Article 14).
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UNHCR, determine the quality of refugee protection. When government
54
commitments to refugees falter, so does UNHCR protection capacity.
While it is sometimes said that UNHCR has a 'mandate to provide
international protection', 55 the protection that UNHCR has the authority to provide on its own is quite limited. The agency's Statute requires
that UNHCR 'shall provide for the protection of refugees', and that it
should seek 'permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting
Governments and, subject to the approval of the Governments concerned, private organizations'. 56 Hence, UNHCR's work somewhat
ambiguously includes both providing protection and assisting governments in doing the same. Yet, the specific activities enumerated in the
Statute make clear that governments bear the primary responsibility.
As set out by the UN General Assembly, UNHCR authority to protect
refugees consists of* Promoting international refugee conventions and supervising their
application;
* Promoting special agreements with states to benefit refugees;
* 'Assisting governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary
repatriation or assimilation within new national communities';
* 'Promoting the admission of refugees';
* Helping refugees obtain permission to transfer assets;
* Obtaining from governments information about refugee conditions;
* Communicating
with
governments
and
inter-governmental
organizations;
* Establishing contact with private organizations and facilitating their
57
efforts to assist refugees.
UNHCR also has a duty to supervise implementation by governments
of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and its mandate has been expanded
by the general growth of human rights law since the 1950s.5 8 But as this
list sets out, UNHCR's most explicit authority is to promote, facilitate,
and assist refugee protection by others, principally by governments.
The United Nations, UNHCR included, has emphasized that refugee
protection is ultimately a state responsibility. In 2003 the General
Assembly made clear that protection is primarily the responsibility of
54 See D. McNamara, 'The Protection of Refugees and the Responsibility of States: Engagement
of Abdication?', (1998) 11 HarvardHuman Rightsjourna1355, 356, ('UNHCR has often been caught in
the middle.... Put simply, Conventions and UN structures are ultimately only as strong as States
allow them to be'); J.C. Hathaway, 'Who should watch over refugee law?', (2002) 14 ForcedMigration
Review 23, 25.
-5 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, above n. 17, at 2 (emphasis added).
56 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereafter
UNHCR Statute) articles 1, 8.
57 UNHCR statute article 7.
58 See Volker TUrk, 'The role of UNHCR in the development of international refugee law',
in Refugee Rights and Realities, 153, 154-155 (Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey eds.) (1999).
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governments. UNHCR, in its Notes on International Protection, has
60
been clear that it can assist governments, but cannot take over for them.
Nevertheless, the fact that UNHCR is so often involved in implementing refugee policies can blur the distinction about whether UNHCR itself
is in fact providing protection. In particular, the application of the principle of primary state responsibility in the context of UNHCR RSD has
been less than clear. UNHCR's 2000 Note on International Protection
acknowledged that where UNHCR performs RSD, 'UNHCR's ability to
ensure the protection of and solutions for those persons recognized as
refugees under its mandate has to depend on the commitment of States,
particularly the host States'. 6 1 However, UNHCR did not explain how
the agency would respond when the necessary state commitment is not
forthcoming.
3.2 Disconnect between UNHCR's legal role and
its RSD activities
In light of the primacy of government protection, three key questions
emerge about UNHCR's RSD activities in Egypt and Lebanon.
First, why would UNHCR continue RSD even when, as in Lebanon,
a host government disregards both UNHCR's refugee status decisions
and the principle of non-refoulement? UNHCR's 1998 internal report on
Lebanon states that RSD was conducted because it 'was able to secure
some minimal protection limited to ensuring protection against refoulement
and to some degree from detention for illegal entry/residence'. However,
this does not explain UNHCR's actual RSD activities in the following
years after widespread deportations began. Two factors in Lebanon
beyond UNHCR's control - detention and refoulement by the Lebanese
government and the US government's decision to put resettlement on
59 UN G.A. Res. 57/187 paras. 7 and 8, A/RES/57/187 (18 Dec. 2002) ('Reiterates that
international protection is a dynamic and action-oriented function, carried out in cooperation with
States and other partners, inter alia, to promote andfacilitate the admission, reception and treatment of
refugees and to ensure durable, protection-oriented solutions, bearing in mind the particular needs
of vulnerable groups; Re-emphasized that the protection of refugees is primarily the responsibility
of States, whose full and effective cooperation, action and political resolve are required to enable
the Office of the High Commissioner to fulfill its mandated functions.') (emphasis added).
60 See UNHCR, Note on International Protection, A/AC.96/930 (7 July 2000), at para. 2.
('While the main responsibility for safeguarding the rights of refugees lies with States, UNHCR's
statutory role is to assist governments to take the necessary measures, starting with asylum and
ending with the realization of durable solutions'); UNHCR Note on International Protection,
A/AC.96/830, (7 Sept. 1994), at para. 13 ('Since sovereign States have the primary responsibility
for respecting and ensuring the fundamental rights of everyone within their territory and subject to
their jurisdiction, effective protection of refugees requires action by the Government of the country of
asylum on their behalf. UNHCR's role in providing international protection consequently, and
above all, involves ensuring that Governments take the necessary action... The fulfilment of the
High Commissioner's international protection function requires the active cooperation of the
Government concerned, and the support of other countries in the international community'.)
61 UNHCR, Note on International Protection, A/AC.96/930 (7 July 2000) at para 25.

The Beleaguered Gatekeeper

15

hold - combined to make refugee protection an increasingly hollow
concept in 2001 and 2002. Yet, UNHCR continued conducting status
determination.
Secondly, why would a state's ratification of the Refugee Convention
appear to have relatively little impact on the nature of UNHCR RSD?
In 2001, more than half of the states where UNHCR performed RSD
were in fact parties to the Refugee Convention. 6 2 On paper, Egypt's
ratification of the Refugee Convention should have superseded its 1954
bilateral agreement with UNHCR, and should have led to the government taking increasing direct responsibility for the administration of
refugee protection. Instead, twenty years after Egypt's ratification of the
Convention, the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding continued in
practice to be the main instrument defining the mechanisms of refugee
protection in the country. Continuation of this system violated one of the
terms of the Refugee Convention. The Convention's article 35 obligated
Egypt to provide to UNHCR 'information and statistical data requested
concerning: (a) the condition of refugees [and] (b) The implementation of
this Convention'. 63 Instead, UNHCR's RSD work in Egypt continued
under the pre-existing arrangement, in which UNHCR itself undertakes to take a 'census of and identifying the refugees eligible under
the mandate of the High Commissioner'. In addition, Egypt had not
implemented the Refugee Convention's Article 17, which requires that
,restrictive measures imposed on aliens or the employment of aliens for
the protection of the national labour market' be lifted once a refugee has
been resident for three years.
Thirdly, why has UNHCR not implemented procedural standards to
match those that the agency advocates for governments? Flaws in
UNHCR's procedures raise special questions because, given its mandate
as a promoter of refugee protection, one would expect UNHCR to be the
guardian of protection standards. On the other hand, some may question
whether UNHCR actually needs to be bound by the same procedural
standards that apply to states.
UNHCR itself has not published any comprehensive policy about its
status determination work that would answer these questions.

4. Shifting responsibility from governments to the UN
4.1 Negative responsibility: a practical explanation for
UNHCR RSD
A convincing answer to the questions raised in the previous section comes
from the concept of 'negative responsibility'. As used by Goodwin-Gill,
62

From analysis of UNHCR, 2001 Statistical Overview.

63 CSR51 art. 35.
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'The doctrine of "negative responsibility" [is] the idea that we are as
much responsible for what we do, as for what we do not do, for deliberately harming others, as for failing to relieve their suffering'. 64 Focusing
on UNHCR operations in militarized refugee camps, Goodwin-Gill has
argued that UNHCR resists stopping operations that fall short of international standards because it would feel responsible for failing to act in
the face of dramatic need. 65 From these examples, Goodwin-Gill argues
UNHCR sometimes acts not because it is mandated to do so, but rather
out of an institutional sense of negative responsibility.
Goodwin-Gill focused on examples of extreme failure of refugee
protection, principally in the Great Lakes region of Africa. But the concept of negative responsibility can also be helpful to explain UNHCR's
refugee status determination work. Although the harms may not be as
extreme as those facing Rwandan and Burundian refugees in the 1990s,
there is a basic parallel in terms of UNHCR's activities. UNHCR's
mandate allows it to choose to do RSD, but it has no specific duty to
conduct RSD. Alexander's article alludes to the concept of negative
responsibility by defining UNHCR RSD in terms of filling gaps left by
governments:
For the most part asylum seekers have no choice but to approach UNHCR,
because very few governments in the region are parties to the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Even some countries
which are parties, such as Cambodia, do not have their own refugee status
determination processes, so refugees cannot apply66 directly to those governments
for recognition. UNHCR steps in to fill the gap.
A review of internal UNHCR annual country reports from the Middle
East from the late 1990s indicates that gap-filling figures prominently in
UNHCR's internal understanding of the rationale for its RSD activities.
Most vividly, the 1998 internal UNHCR report on Lebanon states: 'The
vacuum caused by the lack of any asylum procedures in Lebanon is filled
by UNHCR'. The 1998 report on Djibouti (a party to the Refugee
Convention) says, 'In the absence of an active [government RSD system]
BO [UNHCR Branch Office] is conducting eligibility determination
interviews of asylum seekers and provides those with meritorious cases
protection letters (attestations), pending a final determination of their
status'.
The concept of negative responsibility as an explanation for UNHCR
RSD convincingly answers the three questions posed in the previous
section. First, if filling the RSD vacuum is the policy driver, it is natural
64 G. S. Goodwin-Gill, 'Refugee identity and protection's fading prospect', in F. Nicholson and
P. Twomey (eds.), Refugee Rights and Realities: Evoling International Concepts and Regimes (1999), 220.
65 Ibid., at 240-241.
66 Alexander, above n. 1, at 251.
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that UNHCR would continue RSD even when a host government systematically violates the principle of non-refoulement. Stopping deportations
of refugees is not actually determinative of UNHCR action. Second, if
UNHCR RSD is an attempt to fill a gap left by a government, it is not
surprising that ratification of the Refugee Convention on its own would
not change UNHCR's RSD activities. The non-existence of an alternative RSD system is more decisive than the legal framework established by
the Refugee Convention. Third, in the gap-filling mode, the procedural
flaws in UNHCR are not surprising since UNHCR RSD is conceived
only as a substitute measure, an issue I explore in more detail below in
section 4.3.
The negative responsibility concept highlights the challenges UNHCR
confronts when it conducts RSD. As Goodwin-Gill argues, negative
the agency to
responsibility can be a trap for UNHCR because it leads
67
meet:
to
prepared
not
is
it
that
responsibilities
on
take
Transposed to the institutional context, 'negative responsibility' can be seen to
have led UNHCR to embrace every humanitarian operation remotely connected to the issue of displacement.... Given the complexity of causes, however,
and the finite resources available, such
not to mention their political dimensions
68
engagement is doomed to failure.
Negative responsibility gives UNHCR a limitless burden while simultaneously allowing states to stand back and let UNHCR do the hard work
of implementing refugee protection. The following section explores in
greater detail the ways in which this shift of responsibility for RSD can
be based on misconceptions about UNHCR's mandate, false assumptions
about the necessity of individual RSD, and can ultimately damage
refugee protection.
4.2 Unnecessary reliance on individual RSD
An analysis of UNHCR's RSD activities depends to a great degree on
whether individual status determination is always necessary to ensure
refugee protection. If it is always necessary, UNHCR would naturally
feel substantial pressure to perform RSD in a country that did not set
up its own RSD system. For instance, there is in at least one UNHCR
report an indication that UNHCR based its activities in Egypt for several
69that it could not abandon reliance on individual
years on the premise
•
status determination. If this is the case, it could conceivably be worth
the cost for UNHCR to fill a vacuum left by a government. Yet, in June
67 Goodwin-Gill, above n. 64, at 248.
68 Ibid. at 240-241.
69 See Sperl, above n. 24, at 29 (raising concerns about rejected asylum-seekers in Egypt who
refused to return home, Sper notes that UNHCR disfavored a proposal to create a secondary legal
status for rejected asylum-seeker and insisted on the necessity of a refugee status determination
procedure).
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2004, UNHCR in Cairo suspended individual RSD for most refugees
in Egypt, providing Sudanese temporary protection on a group basis
instead.
On the other hand, if individualized RSD is not always necessary,
then the pressure of negative responsibility on UNHCR should be substantially lessened. There is nothing in refugee law that requires either a
state or UNHCR to conduct individual RSD. The Refugee Convention
sets out a refugee definition, but it does not necessarily require that
the definition be applied through an individualized procedure. If individualized RSD is in essence optional for a state, UNHCR can be
more cautious about incurring the costs and protection challenges
involved in taking on such a role.
UNHCR has been clear that individual RSD is often not necessary.
Rather, whenever the number of asylum-seekers overwhelms a state's
RSD capacity, UNHCR advises adopting prima facie recognition, rather
than conduct flawed individual RSD. Prima facie recognition of all
asylum-seekers is normally assumed to be a reaction to a large scale
influx. But as UNHCR explained in its Global Consultations, the size
of an asylum-seeker influx must be assessed compared to the receiving
state's RSD capacity. 7 ° In a state without any RSD apparatus, even a
small number of asylum-seekers could justify the use of primafacie recognition. Hence, when states leave an RSD gap, UNHCR need not always
carry out individual status determination itself. Instead, UNHCR may
best promote refugee protection by helping a government design prima
facie means of recognizing refugee status.
UNHCR's publications make clear that RSD systems that meet
standards of fairness and efficiency are quite costly in terms of financial
and human resources. Individual refugee status determination requires
significant staffing, time, and facilities when it is conducted fairly.
In 2001, UNHCR advised legislatures: 'Parliamentarians can promote
effectiveness [of RSD] by allocating sufficient resources for refugee status
determination. 71
Refugees also need education, social security, housing, healthcare, and
other services that impose costs on a state. Since government and
UNHCR resources are limited, a decision to engage in individual RSD
should be seen in terms of the resources that could otherwise be spent
on social and economic programs that assist refugees. Promoting refugee
protection might be best facilitated by looking for ways to reduce the
70 UNHCR, Protection of Refugees in Mass Influx Situations: Overall Protection Framework
para.14, EC/GC/01/4, 19 Feb. 2001 ([W]hat amounts to 'large-scale' or 'mass influx' will necessarily differ from country to country and/or region to region, and must be decided on a case-by-case
basis. The analysis needs to take into account the size and speed of the influx balanced against the size
and capaciy of the receiving country to process the cases in individualstatus determination systems) (emphasis added).
" UNHCR, Refugee Protection:A Guide to InternationalRefugee Law, (2001), 50.
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costs of determining legal status by avoiding individual RSD. Relying
extensively on individual applications as the default form of RSD places
increased resource burdens on UNHCR offices. Likewise, a host government in the developing world might understandably be hesitant to take
on such a burden, undermining UNHCR efforts to encourage governments to take greater responsibility for refugee protection.
Rather than fill all RSD gaps left by governments, UNHCR has
the option of encouraging and assisting governments to set up forms of
prima facie refugee recognition that facilitate effective local integration
(and hence reduce the need for resettlement). In such a system, intensive
individual screening would be needed only to identify especially vulnerable refugees, and to deal with exclusion issues.
4.3 UNHCR RSD versus government RSD: the same
procedural standards?
The tendency to see UNHCR RSD as a substitute for government
RSD may provide some explanation, though not justification, for why
UNHCR has not implemented many of its stated standards of fairness
in its own RSD procedures. If UNHCR RSD is thought of as a substitute
measure, there may be doubts about whether procedural standards are as
important with UNHCR as with governments. One does not normally
expect a substitute to be as good as the real thing. In addition, one might
argue that procedural safeguards are less critical with UNHCR because
UNHCR's interests are less adverse to refugee claims than those of
governments. UNHCR was established to protect refugees, while
governments might be interested in migration control and restricting
access to asylum.
In a 1989 training manual, UNHCR made clear that its RSD procedures should be held to the same standards as those run by governments:
'The main elements [of due process applicable to governments] must also
apply to UNHCR if we are to ensure fair and proper examination of
applications'. 72 However, UNHCR has repeatedly questioned whether
it should be73expected to live up to the same standards as states in RSD
procedures.

72 UNHCR, Determination of Refugee Status, RLD 2 (1989).
73 UNHCR's short-lived Mar. 1997 Comprehensive Policy on Urban Refiugees, which was revised after
criticism, asserted that UNHCR procedures could not equal those of 'sophisticated and resource
well-endowed governments'. Cited in Alexander, above n. 1, at 254. UNHR's Sept. 2005 Procedural
Standards, which fall short of the advice that UNECR has given to governments on RSD, state: 'The
RSD Procedural Standards reflect the particular constraints and challenges under which UNHCR
must conduct RSD. They are not intended to identify standards for national procedures, which in
certain States may exceed the standards proposed'. ProceduralStandardsfor Refugee Status Determination
under UNHCR's Mandate at 1-4.
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There are a number of reasons why the same procedural protections

are essential with UNHCR RSD as with government RSD. The stakes in
UNHCR RSD are often just as high as in government RSD, given that
UNHCR refugee recognition facilitates social and economic assistance,
opens doors to resettlement, and in countries like Egypt triggers govern-

ments' respect for the principle of non-refoulement. UNHCR has called fair
and efficient asylum procedures
74 'essential' for full application of the 1951
Geneva Refugee Convention.

Given the way UNHCR RSD works in practice, it would be a mistake
to presume that UNHCR's interests in RSD decision-making are necessarily less adverse to refugee claimants than a government's interests
would be. There are at least three main reasons for this.
First, an abstract commitment to protection is not a substitute for

actual procedures. The International Criminal Court and its Yugoslavia
and Rwanda predecessors have a mandate to protect and enforce
international justice, but nevertheless must guarantee defendants fair
trials. Governments that are party to the Refugee Convention have
a mandate to protect refugees much like UNHCR's. While it is true

that UNHCR's purpose is to protect refugees, the same can be said of
many government
agencies that are responsible for refugee status
75
determination.

Secondly, UNHCR offices conducting RSD are subject to pressures
that have the potential to negatively influence decision-making.
In many UNHCR field offices, protection staff supervising RSD are
74 UNHCR, Asylum-Processes: Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures para. 5 (May 2001). The
UN General Assembly, to which UNHCR is accountable, has urged 'access, consistent with relevant
international and regional instruments, for all asylum-seekers to fair and efficient procedures for the
determination of refugee status and the granting of asylum to eligible persons'. G.A. res. 51/75
para. 4, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 208, UN Doe. A/51/49 (Vol. 1) (1996). See also G.A.
res. 50/152 para. 5, UN Doc. A/RES/50/152 (1995).
7 If UNHCR RSD systems were in fact more favourable to refugee claims than governments,
one might expect to see UNHCR recognize similar refugee claims at a higher rate. But that does not
appear to occur, judging from UNHCR's statistical reports. UNHCR statistical reports suggest that
recognition rates at UNHCR offices are above the rates of some governments receiving claims from
the same nationalities, and below the rates of other government RSD systems.
In some cases, government-run RSD systems post substantially higher recognition rates than
UNHCR offices receiving claims by the same nationalities. For instance, in 2001, UNHCR's
Cairo office recognized 49% of Sudanese claims and 46% of Somali claims. See 2001 UNHCR
Population Statistics, provisional, 7 June 2002, Table 17. The US asylum adjudication system recognized 73% of Sudanese claims, and 70% of Somalis. See 2001 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service at 23 (Table 27). Of course, the merits of refugee claims made in
Egypt may be different from those in the United States or in another country. But at least in theory,
UNHCR-Cairo should have been more open to refugee claims from war-torn countries. UNHCR
maintained a more broad interpretation of the refugee definition for people fleeing war than the US.
Moreover, the UNHCR Cairo office was operating in a country where it could apply the extended
African refugee definition, with its wider protection for people fleeing civil war, while the US did not.
It is therefore noteworthy that UNHCR-Cairo accepted Sudanese and Somali claims less frequently
than the US.
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simultaneously responsible for relations with host governments, resettlement referrals, and for assistance budgets. In this context, there are
several factors that have the potential to negatively influence RSD:
*

*

*

*

UNHCR often provides monetary and other material assistance to
recognized refugees, which introduces a potential financial incentive
for UNHCR to keep the numbers of recognized refugees low.
Host governments are often resistant to allowing large numbers of
recognized refugees to stay in their territories, which can conceivably
create a pressure on a UNHCR office to be cautious about recognizing refugee claims.
In countries where resettlement is the primary durable solution for
recognized refugees, there is a risk of pressure on UNHCR to favor
refugee claims from applicants who can be successfully resettled. 76
In addition to host countries' policies against local integration77
resettlement referrals are indirectly linked to government funding
of UNHCR, since many of UNHCR's 78major donor states are also
UNHCR's major resettlement partners.
UNHCR has increasingly played a role in migration control, not just
refugee protection. This is epitomized by the application of its policy
of sanctions against 'irregular mover' refugees, and by general
concern about creating 'pull factors' that could stimulate increased
refugee migration. Such concerns could encourage field offices to be
relatively strict in their status determination in order to avoid creating
a pull factor of perceived generosity.

The potential for these pressures to influence decisions makes procedural
protections as essential with UNHCR as in RSD systems run by
governments.
Thirdly, human challenges inherent in any RSD process necessitate
safeguards no matter whether UNHCR or a government acts as the
decision-maker. RSD involves formidable cultural, linguistic, legal, and
emotional challenges (including staff stress and 'burnout') which can
affect UNHCR offices just as government agencies.
76 Examination of internal decision-making procedures at UNHCR's Cairo office indicated that

UNHCR durable solutions staff reviewed positive RSD decisions, and had authority to ask RSD staff
and supervisors to clarify, justify, or reconsider cases. See Kagan, above n. 2, at 30-33.
77 For instance, the 1954 Egypt-UNHCR agreement requires UNHCR to seek resettlement out
of
Egypt, rather than seek opportunities to integrate refugees into Egyptian life. Other countries in the
region, such as Jordan and Lebanon, similarly insist that any refugee residence on their territories
must be temporary.
78 See G. Troeller, 'UNHCR Resettlement: Evolution and Future Direction', 14
WJRL
85, 89
(2002) ('In contrast to the less than central importance accorded within UNHCR to resettlement
over much of the last decade, major donors, many of whom are resettlement partners, have continued to attach great importance to resettlement as this function is directly involved in the question of
who is admitted to their respective countries').
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Limited procedures at UNHCR offices pose the same basic risk as
limited procedures operated by governments: bona fide refugees who
are in danger in their countries of origin risk being denied protection.
The principle of non-refoulement as spelled out in the Refugee Convention
prohibits a state from returning 'in any manner whatsoever' any refugee
to a country where his or her life or freedom would be in danger. A state's
obligation to not forcibly return a refugee applies to any asylumseeker until his or her claim has been refused in a fair determination
process. 79 Currently, UNHCR's RSD procedures do not satisfy this
80
requirement because they lack several key procedural safeguards.
Rejected asylum-seekers may in fact be refugees who would be recognized in a system with minimal procedural protections. Deporting
81
such people amounts to refoulement in fact if not refoulement in form.
Until the current limits of UNHCR's RSD procedures are overcome,
de facto refoulement will often be the most direct and glaring protection
problem resulting when UNHCR uses its RSD procedures to fill gaps
left by governments.
4.4 Undermined UNHCR moral authority
Shifting RSD responsibility from a government to UNHCR poses a
two-fold threat to UNHCR's mandate to supervise refugee law. First,
by performing a role normally reserved for governments, UNHCR
acquires the burden of living up to the standards it promotes for governments. If UNHCR fails to do this, UNHCR's moral authority to set
standards for states will be eroded. Second, by becoming intimately
involved in the implementation of refugee law, UNHCR faces a conflict
of interest in being able to effectively supervise refugee law.
UNHCR often lacks the concrete leverage to change state behavior,
and its ability to confront governments that violate refugee rights is often
hampered by the agency's dependence on the same governments for
funding and access. 82 UNHCR issues substantial guidance and advice
to governments on refugee protection standards, but none of it is binding.
Since UNHCR has no enforcement authority over states, UNHCR's
efforts to set standards depend on how the agency is perceived subjectively. Preserving UNHCR's moral authority on matters of refugee

79 See J.C. Hathaway, 'Refugee Law is Not Immigration Law', in US Committee for
Refugees,
World Refiugee Survey (2002) 38.
80 CSR51 article 33.
81 See T.A. Aleinikoff, 'Aliens, Due Process and Community Ties: A Response to Martin', (1983)

44 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 237, 251 ('it
seems to me that the appropriate standard of
accuracy [in RSD] should be the percentage of good claims denied, not the percentage of all claims
properly decided').
8 See G. Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics (2001) 350; G. Loescher, Beyond Chariy:
International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crsis (1993) 138.
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protection standards, therefore,
must be a high concern for the agency,
83
and for refugee advocates.
UNHCR's standard setting work has been criticized because its advice
to states sometimes appears detached from practical protection contexts. 84 UNHCR's role in RSD in much of the south is contrary to the
long observed declining significance of UNHCR's legal authority in
more developed asylum systems in western countries. UNHCR may
be losing legal infuence in the geopolitical north even as it has acquired
government-like power in many places in the south. In RSD, the more
precise problem is that while UNHCR has tremendous practical experience in the field, it has not implemented many of its own standards. The
strains that this puts on UNHCR's moral authority have already become
obvious. In 2001, Australia's Minister of Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs, Philip Ruddock, attempted to deflect UNHCR criticism of
Australia's restrictive refugee policies by complaining that UNHCR did
not hold itself to the same standards in its refugee status determination
activities. According to news media reports, Ruddock said: 'There is one
standard for the UNHCR, and there is another standard that elements of
the UNHCR impose on developed countries and I don't think it can go
on'. 86 Ruddock's criticisms were no justification for Australia's policies,
but they illustrate the importance for UNHCR to lead by example.
Leaving aside the issue of UNHCR's moral authority, UNHCR RSD
gives the agency a conflict of interest in attempting to supervise refugee
protection. 87 Normally, it would fall to UNHCR to identify major gaps
in an RSD process. A significant danger posed by UNHCR performing RSD is that UNHCR will not be in a position to provide complete
evaluations of refugee protection. For instance, in one case Sweden
argued to the UN Committee against Torture that it could return an
83

See M. Weiner, 'The Clash of Norms: Dilemmas in Refugee Policies', (1998) 11 JRS 433, 435

('One view of UNHCR [ ] is that it must adhere to its own norms if it is to have any success in
getting states to do so. Institutions that make or implement norms have a dual responsibility: Strict
adherence to norms in their own conduct, and the responsibility of persuading governments and
private bodies to conform to the norms'); G. Gilbert, 'Rights, Legitimate Expectations, Needs and
Responsibilities: UNHCR and the New World Order', 10 JJRL 349, 373 (1998).
SeeJ.C. Hathaway, 'Who should watch over refugee law?' (2002) 14 Forced Migration Review 23,
24 ('In practice, neither DIP [UNHCR's Department of International Protection] nor EXCOM
[UNHCR's Executive Committee] has done enough to provide systematic, non-crisis policy guidance
on the substance of refugee law, carefully anchored in the real context of refugee protection
challenges').
85 SeeJ. C. Hathaway, 'A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law', (1990) 31
HarvardInternationalLaw Journal 129, 166.
86 Quoted in M. Christie, 'Australia blasts UN stance on illegal migration', Reuters (21 Feb. 2001).
87 See generally Hathaway, above n. 85, at 24-25 (2002) ('UNHCR is no longer at arms-length
from the implementation of refugee protection.... UNHCR therefore faces a dilemma, in my view.
Either it must return to concentrating on the implementation of its core supervisory responsibilities,
and leave what has become the majority of its operational mandate to others; or it must concede that
it cannot ethically supervise itself, and endorse establishment of a genuinely arms-length body to
ensure the oversight of the Refugee Convention').
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Iraqi asylum-seeker to Jordan because Jordan had agreed to allow
refugees recognized by the local UNHCR office to stay. 88 In opposing
Sweden's position, UNHCR's submissions did not address the adequacy
of the RSD procedures at its office in Jordan, even though that was central to the protection Sweden asserted Mr Korban could find there.
Instead, UNHCR based
its advice on the fact that he might not be
89
admitted to Jordan.

5. UNHCR RSD: Re-asssessing when, where,
why and how
5.1 Using RSD to promote protection
UNHCR has engaged in RSD in a large and diverse group of countries,
with growing backlogs of cases, growing financial strain, and continuing
procedural gaps. These circumstances call for a re-assessment about if,
when, where, why and how UNHCR should conduct RSD.
No legal instrument requires UNHCR to determine refugee status
under any circumstances. UNHCR has a duty to protect refugees, but
only by indirect means, principally by encouraging governments to live
up to their protection obligations and share protection responsibilities.
The difference between promoting protection and directly providing it
is not just a legal nuance. UNHCR lacks the power to effectively protect
refugees when governments steadfastly refuse to do so. UNHCR does not
have the legal authority to force a state to change its policies, and it lacks
the financial and human resources to substitute its work for roles normally assigned to governments. UNHCR's power to protect refugees
depends heavily on its moral authority and its capacity to focus its
resources where they can best encourage governments to develop their
own protection capacity.
Despite cause for caution about UNHCR RSD, it would be an
overly extreme reaction for UNHCR to suspend all refugee status
determination. The basic argument advanced in this article has been
that UNHCR RSD in certain circumstances facilitates meaningful protection for refugees, but that UNHCR RSD, as practised now, shifts
responsibility from governments to the UN in ways that strain resources,
erode UNHCR's moral authority, and sometimes do not achieve tangible
benefits for refugees. This situation calls not for ending UNHCR RSD,
but for searching for more focused ways for UNHCR to use its RSD
work as a tool to effectively promote protection by governments.
In general, UNHCR should conduct RSD in fewer countries and for
shorter periods than it does now. At the same time, UNHCR can offer
8 Avedes Hamayak Korbanv. Sweden, Committee against Torture, Communication No. 88/1997 at 4.8.
89 Ibid.
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to perform RSD where governments are willing to take concrete and
active steps to improve their refugee protection policies. In American
political terms, this calls for a 'mend it, don't end it' re-assessment of
UNHCR RSD. 90
UNHCR's refugee status determination activities can be reconfigured
as a means to promote government protection of refugees through four
main strategies:
a. Promote primafacie refugee recognition
Because fair individual RSD is both high risk and resource intensive,
it should be a fall back option rather than a cornerstone of refugee protection. Group-based refugee recognition would render moot many concerns about UNHCR's RSD procedures. A host government's reluctance
to establish its own RSD system should be taken as an initial signal that
individual RSD may not be viable, rather than be interpreted as a gap
that UNHCR should step in immediately to fill. Even where individual
RSD is necessary, its viability depends on the host government's and/or
UNHCR's capacity to actually set up a fair and efficient system.
UNHCR's first priority should be to promote at least temporary protection for all asylum-seekers, rather than to find a way to individually
adjudicate each claim.
b. Link UNHCR RSD to government reciprocity and burden sharing
Since UNHCR is funded internationally, its work is in essence a means
of sharing the costs of refugee protection. UNHCR performance of
RSD should hence be construed as a service to a host state, giving
UNHCR a carrot which it can offer to governments. In exchange for
performing a task normally left to a government, UNHCR should expect
90 This approach, at a more specific level, is consistent with what Volker TOrk recently urged in
response to UNHCR's often complicated role in national refugee status determination systems. Tirk
argued:
Compared to other international involvement in national legal and administrative systems, the exercise of the UNHCR's supervisory role is rather unique in this respect. In fact, it may be the only UN
organisation that is directly involved in national law-making, national procedures and national
decision-making. This is not to say that such involvement does not have its own set of difficulties,
such as the possibility of being perceived to be closely associated with government policies. Other
problems concern a real or perceived lack of independence because of dependency on the funding of
donor countries as well as operational obstacles hindering the implementation of certain aspects of
supervision, for instance, through denial of access to refugees or inadequate involvement in the
legislative process. These difficulties are, however, of a practical nature that would need to be
addressed at the practical, operational level. It would be wrong to deduce from these problems a
need to change the supervisory system as a whole. Before embarking on a discussion about how to
enhance the UNHCR's supervisory role, it is therefore crucial to acknowledge the achievements that
have been made by involving an international institution in domestic legal and adminsitrative
contexts and to build any strengthening of the UNHCR's role around these achievements.
V. Ttirk, 'UNHCR's Supervisory Responsibility', New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper
No. 67 (Oct. 2002), at p. 15-16 (available at www.unhcr.ch, Research/Evaluation).
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some tangible positive steps toward refugee protection in exchange. In
some manner, UNHCR's performance of RSD should advance refugee
protection beyond the status quo ante. For instance, in exchange for
UNHCR performing RSD, a state might be asked to open its school
or hospital systems to refugees, if this was not done previously.
UNHCR should not conduct RSD where governments offer nothing in
exchange, especially where governments even refuse to recognize the
basic principle of non-refoulement. If UNHCR is to continue conducting
RSD over a long period of years, the host state should be expected to
similarly continue improving its refugee protection policies in exchange;
a one-time step forward should not justify an indefinite commitment by
UNHCR.
c. Limit UNHCR RSD in states paroy to the Refugee Convention
Promotion of government responsibility for refugee protection should lead
UNHCR to be more cautious about conducting RSD in states that have
ratified the Refugee Convention. By ratifying the Convention, such states
have already committed themselves to the principle of non-refoulement,
along with a range of civil, political, social, and economic rights for
refugees. Hence, UNHCR conduct of RSD carries a special risk that
responsibility already agreed to by a government will in effect shift
back to the UN without any reciprocal gain in refugee protection. In
states that are party to the Refugee Convention, UNHCR RSD can
still be useful to promote refugee protection, but under more strictly
defined arrangements that expect more from governments. For instance,
UNHCR might conduct RSD in a time-limited transitional period while
helping to develop a government's own RSD system. Or, UNHCR might
conduct RSD in exchange for a government extending refugee protection
beyond the requirements of the Convention, for instance by making
refugees eligible for immediate work permits or permanent residence.
d. Make UNHCR RSD procedures a model of best practice
Protecting refugees and maintaining UNHCR's moral authority necessitate that UNHCR implement the procedural fairness standards it has
promoted for states whenever it conducts RSD. Even if other conditions
are met, UNHCR should refrain from conducting RSD whenever it
cannot implement these standards. In addition to improving protection
in host countries, UNHCR should use its RSD work as a means to lead
other countries by example. By being more strict about where and when
it conducts RSD, UNHCR should be able to focus more fiscal and
human resources on its RSD activities, using its RSD sites as demonstration grounds for models of best practice which can then be promoted to
governments.
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Establishing clear standards of transparency should be a priority in
the reform of UNHCR RSD. UNHCR's September 2005 publication
of global standards for mandate status determination was an important
step. 9 1 There remain substantial gaps between UNHCR policy and
established international standards of fairness, especially on establishing
an independent appeal system and putting applicants and decisionmakers on an equal footing in terms of access to evidence.
In addition to improving procedural policies and practices, UNHCR
RSD would benefit from built-in institutional feedback mechanisms that
would simultaneously raise and enforce standards. UNHCR could create
an RSD ombudsman office, and publish an annual or biannual report
assessing and detailing RSD procedures used at its various offices.
UNHCR should also establish an independent UNHCR RSD Appeal
Tribunal staffed by independent refugee law experts to publish rulings
on selected cases emanating from field offices that raise important legal
issues. 92 All rejected asylum-seekers should enjoy an appeal of right in
local field offices. This tribunal would be a tertiary appeal level (rather
than an automatic appeal) that would select cases from field offices that
raise important issues. Its decisions would be binding on UNHCR offices,
allowing UNHCR to develop an evolving body of jurisprudence from
real cases. It would be similar to having an international refugee court,
but since this tribunal would only hear appeals from UN offices, it would
lack the political downsides implied in having a UN agency reviewing
decisions by governments. 93 Nevertheless, its precedents could be persuasive guidance for domestic courts hearing refugee cases.
5.2 UNHCR RSD as a means of pressuring governments?
I have examined UNHCR RSD from the assumption that refugee status
determination should produce direct protection for refugees. Recognizing
refugee status is a formal, symbolic act that has importance for refugees
only if governments accept its legitimacy by protecting refugee rights.
From this argument, the basis for UNHCR RSD is very questionable
in a country that, like Lebanon in 2001 and 2002, systematically violates
the principle of non-refoulernent.
But what if UNHCR were to conduct individual RSD in a country
precisely because a recalcitrant government refused to accept basic refugee rights? UNHCR might hope that the symbolic act of the United
91 Such a step was called for by Alexander, above n. 1, at 286.
92 See Alexander, above n. 1, at 287 (proposing an independent appeals system and urging
UNHCR to publish appeals decisions); M. Kagan, 'The UN Needs a Refugee Court', (2005)
RSDWatch Forum, www.rsdwatch.org.
93 See A. Pyati, 'Overseeing the Refugee Convention Working Paper No. I: Reporting', para. 7
(Dec. 2001) (available at http://www.icva.ch/cgibin/browse.pl?doc=doc00000505) (noting that
offering comments on state practices under the Refugee Convention would put UNHCR in conflict
with governments).
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Nations officially recognizing the existence of refugees would make it
more difficult for the government to ignore their rights. It might be
argued that the best way to confront a government that claims there
are no real refugees on its soil would be for UNHCR to assess individual
cases and declare that there are, in fact, refugees present. In a similar
vein, UNHCR can demand a government grant access to detained
asylum-seekers in order to assess whether they are in fact refugees. This
tactic could in theory work in some circumstances, but there are reasons
for caution.
To make this approach work, UNHCR would need to scrupulously
follow standards of procedural fairness. Using RSD to pressure a government would assume that UNHCR will readily recognize refugees in the
face of government pressure. Without such safeguards, UNHCR may
be as much subject to pressure from governments as vice versa. The
Lebanon example feeds such concerns, given that UNHCR's RSD
recognition rate dropped from over 40 percent to below 10 percent in
just a few years at the same time that government detentions and deportations increased. 94 While there is no direct evidence on which to argue
the two phenomena are linked, the correlation is cause for concern. Just
as UNHCR could shame a government by recognizing refugees
the government prefers to ignore, UNHCR could give dangerous government policies a veneer of legitimacy if UNHCR mistakenly rejects
bonafide refugees.
Beyond the mechanics of RSD, the problem with this approach is that
it would put UNHCR into direct confrontation with a recalcitrant
government. There are many good reasons to want a UN agency willing
and able to take such stands. But there are doubts about whether
UNHCR is such an agency, given its heavy dependency on governments
for funding and access. UNHCR's experience and assets are best suited
to using inducements and dialogue to encourage better government
policies. Performing RSD is something that UNHCR can offer to a government, but not necessarily something UNHCR can use to challenge
a government.

6. Conclusion
UNHCR's current RSD activities around the globe appear as an ad hoc
response to government failures, though there are indications that
UNHCR is now beginning to reassess its approach. On the ground,
UNHCR's RSD activities appear explained by an inclination to fill
gaps left by governments, but this is neither a sufficient justification for
94 Based on figures from UNHCR Statistical Overviews and UNHCR, 2002 Population Statistics

(Provisional).
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UNHCR's RSD work, nor a fully developed plan of action. There are no
published UNHCR guidelines that set out a systematic strategy for confronting the challenges inherent in substituting UN work for government
responsibility. In October 2004, UNHCR's Director of International
Protection Erika Feller told the UNHCR Executive Committee that:
We are also undertaking a concerted analysis of the role of RSD in UNHCR's
global protection strategies, with a view to seeing where we should be strength95
ening our efforts, as well as where RSD might not be the correct response.
As UNHCR's RSD burden has grown in recent years, UNHCR needs a
fully developed strategy to help it make country-by-country decisions
about conducting RSD.
For international refugee law to function, it is essential to identify, from
the mass of migrants around the world, those refugees eligible to enjoy
international protection. This is a job designed for governments, but it is
one that UNHCR could do well under certain circumstances. But to do it
well, UNHCR must measure its endeavors to its actual authority and
resources, and be willing to stand back even when governments fail to
protect refugees.
Too often, weaknesses in UNHCR RSD operations have appeared as
symptoms of an agency operating under too much strain, with too few
staff to answer asylum-seekers' most basic inquiries, procedures that fail
UNHCR's own stated standards, and limited impact on government
policy. This predicament is not inevitable and it need not continue. In
the foreseeable future, RSD could be a means for UNHCR to lead states
by example.

95 E. Feller, Statement at Fifty-fifth Session of the Executive
Commissioner's Programme, 7 Oct. 2004.
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